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A Bivariate Forecasting Model For Russian GDP Under Structural Changes In 
Monetary Policy and Long-Term Growth 
Abstract 
This paper estimates a bivariate econometric model to describe Russia’s real GDP while 
taking account of the Russian economy’s high dependence on oil prices, monetary policy 
regime change, and economic growth slowdown. We follow the theory of long-run neutrality 
of monetary policy and assume that the Bank of Russia’s monetary policy regime change in 
late 2014 has influenced only the short-run relationship between Russia’s GDP and oil prices, 
but long-run multiplier is invariant to monetary policy. The paper also attempts to take 
account of the economic growth slowdown in last decade. The model has demonstrated good 
forecasting performance. 
Key words: monetary policy, Russian economy, terms of trade, ARX model, ECM model, 
structural breaks  
JEL: E32, E37, E52 
Introduction 
The paper presents a forecasting model for Russian GDP, incorporates the high 
dependence on terms of trade, slowdown of economic growth in Russia after the global 
financial crisis, and the change in the monetary policy regime in the fourth quarter of 2014. 
Forecasting macroeconomic indicators is essential in economic analysis. When developing 
measures of monetary and fiscal policies, regulators make decisions based on their own 
forecast models. This applies to the Bank of Russia and the Ministry of Economic 
Development of Russia, as well as other authorities in the economic and social areas. Besides, 
almost all Russian research centers and economic policy authorities have their own 
forecasting models. The Russian economic literature describes a considerable number of such 
forecasting models, including ARIMA models (Turuntseva et al., 2015), VAR models 
(Turuntseva et al., 2005), large macroeconometric models (Mikhailenko, 2005; Uzyakov et 
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al., 2009; Ayvazyan et al., 2013 ), factor models (Styrin, Potapova, 2009; Astafieva, 
Turuntseva, 2014; Porshakov et al., 2015), BVAR models (Demeshev, Malakhovskaya, 2015; 
Deryugina, Ponomarenko, 2015; Pestova, Mamonov, 2016b) and DSGE models (Ivaschenko, 
2013; Malakhovskaya, 2016; Kreptsev, Seleznev, 2018). Some authors as Turuntseva (2011), 
and Pestova, Mamonov (2016a) provide extensive reviews of the Russian forecast models. 
However, the implications of the transition to the inflation targeting regime for the Russian 
GDP have not yet been studied in depth. Therefore there is a need new type of forecasting 
model which take into account the changes that entails the transition to the new monetary 
policy regime. 
The paper has a following structure: In the first section, we briefly describe the 
overview of the Russian economy over the period under consideration, describe the 
importance of the terms of trade and monetary policy. In the section “Specification of the 
model” we construct the ARX and ECM models and take into account the factors mentioned 
in the section earlier. In the section “Estimation of the model”, we present the results of 
models estimation and analyze the influence of the oil prices on Russian GDP in different 
monetary policy regimes based on impulse response analysis. In the forecasting section, we 
test the ARX and ECM out of sample forecasting performance. 
Overview of the Russian economy 
Crude oil prices are the most important indicator of foreign economic conditions and a 
salient determinant of the key macroeconomic indicators in Russia’s economy. Exports of 
crude oil, natural gas, and refined petroleum products make up the majority of Russia’s 
exports; therefore, oil prices can be used as a proxy variable for terms of trade. Oil prices 
tumbled during the 2008–2009 and 2014–2015 financial crises. Russia lost 7.8% of its GDP 
(in constant prices) in 2009, compared with a 2.8% contraction in 2015. Oil prices were 
definitely not the only negative determinant of the 2009 drop in output. However, many 
experts predicted, based on historical data analysis, that Russia would plunge into a deep 
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economic recession in 2015 and face a 5–9% decline in GDP. A soft decline in production 
during the most recent financial crisis can be accounted for by the Bank of Russia’s monetary 
policy change from a managed float to a floating exchange rate and inflation targeting 
regimes.  
From a theoretical point of view, a floating exchange rate regime is more conducive 
than is a managed float to stabilizing business activity in emerging economies (Devereux et 
al. 2006; Friedmanm 1953; Gertler et al. 2007). If foreign economic conditions change under 
the floating exchange rate regime, the real exchange rate can quickly adjust to its long-run 
equilibrium through change in the nominal exchange rate. Under the managed float regime, 
by contrast, the real exchange rate adjustment would require prices of goods to be changed; 
therefore, when price flexibility is not absolute, extended periods of time may elapse before 
the adjustment to the equilibrium takes place. Consequently, long periods of real exchange 
rate misalignment and a wide gap between domestic goods’ demand and the effective level of 
demand can be seen under a managed ruble exchange rate. Broda (2004) and Edwards and 
Yeyati (2005) provided empirical evidence suggesting that a floating exchange rate has a 
stabilizing effect on output under the influence of terms-of-trade shocks. Figure 1 presents the 
Russian real GDP in 2011 constant prices from Rosstat and the real Brent oil prices, which we 
get by deflating nominal oil prices (U.S. Energy Information Administration) by the dollar 
CPI (FRED Economic Data). Quarterly oil prices are getting by averaging of monthly 
nominal prices. At final, we have all data in quarterly expression from 1999Q1 to 2018Q4. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
The Bank of Russia’s move to the inflation targeting and floating exchange rate regimes 
can, therefore, be regarded as a positive economic policy aimed at stabilizing business 
activity. However, a change in the MP (monetary policy) regime leads to a change in the 
cross-correlation relationship between macroeconomic indicators, meaning that a structural 
change in the parameters of regression equations can be seen due to the MP regime change. 
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The presence of structural changes, in turn, can substantially impair the forecasting 
performance of macroeconomic models as a result of misspecification (Clements and Hendry 
2006; Pesaran et al. 2006). 
The Bank of Russia shifted to the floating exchange rate regime late in 2014; therefore, 
the number of observations for estimating the model parameters under this new regime is very 
small. Making use of the preceding monetary policy regime’s information about system 
parameters, which are stable in time, is a promising approach in this context. The key 
underlying premise of the model developed in this paper rests on the hypothesis that monetary 
policy is neutral in the long term and that monetary policy regimes influence only the short-
run dynamics of the economic system adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. The MP regime 
change is assumed to involve only a change in the nature of adjustment of real 
macroeconomic indicators to the long-run equilibrium, while the long-run multipliers of the 
real macroeconomic indicators with respect to fundamental shocks remain invariant to the 
MP regime. 
We built econometric models—based on the works of (Beck et al., 2007; 
Kuboniwa, 2014; Rautava, 2004)—under the premise of long-run relationship between 
Russian real GDP and oil prices (a proxy for terms of trade). Accordingly, we assumed that 
the long-run elasticity of GDP with respect to oil prices is invariant to the MP regime. We 
decided upon pair regressions between GDP and oil prices, given the small number of 
observations at hand. We considered two specifications—either with or without cointegration 
between them—to ensure robust results. The second specification allows for no cointegration, 
because other skipped nonstationary factors of Russian GDP could possibly be at play. 
The long-run dependence of an oil producing economy on oil prices can be explained 
through the capital formation channel. Esfahani et al. (2014) relied on an extended Solow 
model (Solow, 1956) to substantiate the cointegration relation for some oil producing 
economies by supposing that some oil export earnings are saved in the form of fixed 
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investment. Positive dependence of the oil producing economy’s output level on the level of 
oil prices is substantiated within the context of the premises laid out by the authors: a 
permanent rise in oil prices implies an increase in investment and, therefore, in the volume of 
physical capital, which represents the factor of production of goods and services, thereby 
resulting in a permanent increase in output in the long term. In Ramsey’s multisector models 
of optimal growth, a rise in oil prices and an improvement in terms of trade brings about 
higher returns on investment in both the export-led sectors and the nontradable sectors (prices 
of nontradables increase due to higher demand), thereby boosting the volume of capital in the 
economy, output, fixed capital per worker, and worker’s labor productivity (Idrisov et al., 
2015). 
We also assume that the long-run growth rate of Russia’s economy remained unchanged 
when the floating exchange rate regime was established. Figure 1, however, shows a distinct 
break in the long-run growth trend around the 2008–2009 crisis. Russian GDP demonstrated 
very high growth rates until 2008–2009, which can be interpreted through recovery growth 
after the transformation downturn. However, the growth rate slowed considerably afterwards, 
possibly because the rapid growth via the channel of imitation of technologies had lost its 
potential against the backdrop of a considerably narrowing labor productivity gap between 
domestic and foreign economies. Based on a cointegrated regression model, Polbin and 
Skrobotov (2016) provided formal statistical evidence supporting this change in the trend 
slope, and identified a change in 2007Q3, shortly before the 2008–2009 financial crisis. In 
this paper, we also consider this structural change. 
 
Specification of the model 
We assume that a stochastic process for the Russian real GDP 𝑦𝑡 is given by the 
equation ln𝑦𝑡  = 𝜏𝑡 + 𝛽ln𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝜈𝑡 , (1) 
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where 𝜏𝑡 is the trend component representing growth factors orthogonal to oil prices, 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡  is 
real oil prices, 𝛽 is the long-run elasticity of Russian GDP with respect to oil prices, and 𝜈𝑡 is 
a zero mean reverting stochastic process that can correlate with oil prices. 
We assume that the logarithm of oil prices follow a random walk, which is consistent 
with poor predictability of oil prices (Alquist et al., 2013). In this context, the current value of ln𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡 can be defined as a permanent level of this variable, while the value ln𝑦𝑡𝑝   = 𝜏𝑡 +𝛽ln𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡 can be defined as a permanent level of GDP. We also assume that the MP regime 
change has no effect whatsoever on the component ln𝑦𝑡𝑝 but, rather, alters only the cross-
correlation properties of the process 𝜈𝑡. 
We also allow for breaks in the long-term growth of the component 𝜏𝑡. Given the small 
number of observations at hand, we assume that there was a single structural change in the 
long-term growth rates of the variable 𝜏𝑡 at the point of time 𝑇1, which we suppose to have 
occurred around the time of the 2008–2009 crisis. This paper considers two specifications. 
The first assumes that the variable 𝜏𝑡 is described by a random walk with drift and with 
structural changes in the drift parameter. Then, output and oil prices are not cointegrated time 
series, in which case we build a ARX model. In the second specification, we assume that 𝜏𝑡 is 
the segmented linear deterministic trend. Then, Russian GDP is cointegrated with real oil 
prices in a model with this deterministic trend, and an error correction model is а proper 
model for real GDP. 
 For the first case, the model is given as 
{  
  (∆ln𝑦𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡) =∑𝛼𝑖1 (∆ln𝑦𝑡−𝑖 − 𝜇𝑡−𝑖)+∑𝑏𝑗1∆ ln(𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡−𝑗) + 𝜀𝑡1, 𝑡 < 𝑇2𝑞1𝑗=0𝑝1𝑖=1(∆ln𝑦𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡) =∑𝛼𝑖2 (∆ln𝑦𝑡−𝑖 − 𝜇𝑡−𝑖)+∑𝑏𝑗2∆ ln(𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡−𝑗) + 𝜀𝑡2𝑞2𝑗=0𝑝2𝑖=1 , 𝑡 ≥ 𝑇2
, (2) 
where 𝑇2 is the date of the MP regime change, namely, in the fourth quarter of 2014, 𝜀𝑡1~𝑁(0, 𝜎12), 𝜀𝑡2~𝑁(0, 𝜎22), and the long-term growth rate 𝜇𝑡  is given as 
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𝜇𝑡 = {𝜇0, 𝑡 < 𝑇1𝜇1, 𝑡 ≥ 𝑇1, (3) 
The assumption that the long-run elasticity of output with respect to oil prices is 
invariant to the MP regime places the following restriction on the parameters under various 
regimes: ∑ 𝑏𝑗1𝑞1𝑗=01 − ∑ 𝛼𝑖1𝑝1𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑏𝑗2𝑞2𝑗=01 − ∑ 𝛼𝑖2𝑝2𝑖=1 ≡ 𝛽, (4) 
Juselius (2006) classifies this structural change as mean shift, which implies by itself 
that the first difference of time series over the period under review fluctuates around several 
mean levels (see Fig. 6.2, left-side panels), and the time series in the levels follows several 
trends with different slopes. 
In the second case, the relation (1) takes the form 
ln𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝜇0𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝑑𝑡𝑡) + 𝜇1𝑡 ∗ 𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽ln𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 𝜈𝑡 , 
(5) 
where 𝑐 is the constant, 𝑡 is the linear trend, and the variable 𝑑𝑡𝑡 is a dummy variable of the 
form: 𝑑𝑡𝑡 = {0, 𝑡 < 𝑇11, 𝑡 ≥ 𝑇1. (6) 
In this model setup, the parameter 𝜇0 is the long-term growth rate of GDP under the 
regime preceding the structural change, and the parameter 𝜇0 denotes the long-term growth 
rate of output under the regime following the structural change at the point of time 𝑇1. The 
parameter 𝛾 corresponds to the magnitude of the output jump at the point of structural change. 
Before the structural change in 2007q3 deterministic trend change with rate equal to 𝜇0, 
after structural change with rate equal to 𝜇1. However, the rate of change of the deterministic 
component at the time of the break is not equal to (𝜇1 + 𝛾 ∗ ∆𝑑𝑡𝑡). At time 𝑡 = 𝑇1 − 1, the 
value of the determined trend is 𝑐 + 𝜇0(𝑇1 − 1 ), and at time 𝑡 = 𝑇1, the value of the 
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determined trend is 𝑐 + 𝜇0𝑇1 + (𝜇1 − 𝜇0)𝑇1 + 𝛾. Then the first trend difference at the 
moment 𝑇1 is equal to 𝜇1𝑇1 − 𝜇0(𝑇1 − 1 ) + 𝛾.  
Then, an error correction model takes the form: 
{  
  (∆ln𝑦𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡) = 𝜃1𝜈𝑡−1 +∑𝛼𝑖1(∆ ln𝑦𝑡−𝑖 − ?̃?𝑡−𝑖)+∑𝑏𝑗1∆ ln(𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡−𝑗) + 𝜀𝑡1 , 𝑡 < 𝑇2𝑞1𝑗=0𝑝1𝑖=1(∆ln𝑦𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡) = 𝜃2𝜈𝑡−1 +∑𝛼𝑖2(∆ ln𝑦𝑡−𝑖 − ?̃?𝑡−𝑖)+∑𝑏𝑗2∆ ln(𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑡−𝑗) + 𝜀𝑡2, 𝑡 ≥ 𝑇2𝑞2𝑗=0𝑝2𝑖=1
 (7) 
Where: 
𝜇?̃? = { 𝜇0, 𝑡 < 𝑇1𝜇1𝑇1 − 𝜇0(𝑇1 − 1 ) + 𝛾, 𝑡 = 𝑇1𝜇1, 𝑡 > 𝑇1 , (8) 
а 𝜈𝑡−1 is the corrective component lag.  
Thus, the ECM model has an extra parameter of the jump in the output trend at the 
time of structural change 𝑇1. In light of the above, the reader may ask why the ARX model 
does not include this parameter at the time of structural change. The answer is: We do not do 
this because we rely on the ARX model’s assumption that the structural component is a 
stochastic trend. In this specification, all changes in the trend level are realized through 
stochastic trend shocks, and the analyzed changes are indistinguishable from deterministic 
jumps in the level. 
Estimation of the model 
The model was econometrically estimated using data for the period between 1999Q1 
and 2018Q4. The multiplicative seasonal component was removed from the time series of real 
GDP using ARIMA-X-12 in Eviews. Given a number of lags and dates of structural changes, 
the model was estimated by a maximum likelihood method. In the ARX model, the likelihood 
function was maximized using the fmincon function in Matlab. The problem was thus reduced 
to maximizing a nonlinear function with no restrictions. OLS estimates of unrestricted models 
in sub-periods were used as starting values for searching the maximum. 
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For ECM estimation, we use a concentrated maximum likelihood approach where short-
run parameters are estimated by the OLS method within fixed parameters of the long-run 
cointegrated relationship. The likelihood function with respect to the parameters of the 
cointegration relationship was also optimized using the fmincon function in Matlab, in which 
DOLS (Saikkonen, 1991; Stock and Watson, 1993) estimates of the cointegration relationship 
(5) were used as the starting value. 
As noted above, the monetary policy regime change date 𝑇2 is set in 2014Q4, when the 
Bank of Russia moved to the floating exchange rate and inflation-targeting regimes. For the 
purpose of simplicity, a consistent estimator from Polbin and Skrobotov (2016), which 
corresponds to 2007Q3 and was obtained by minimizing squared residuals in the 
cointegrating regression between GDP and real oil prices, was used as the date 𝑇1 of the 
structural change in long-term growth rates. The results obtained in this paper appear stable, 
with a minor variance of the date of structural change in the long-term growth rates. 
The number of lags was selected according to the Akaike information criterion (Akaike 
1974): 𝐴𝐼𝐶(𝑝) = 2𝑝 − 2 ln(𝐿), (9) 
where 𝑝 is the total number of parameters under both regimes, which, in the ЕСМ model, also 
includes 5 parameters of the cointegration relationship. 
When estimating information criterion values in the ECM model, the number of GDP 
and oil price lags is selected up to 6 under the first regime and up to 2 under the second 
regime, due to a short sample length under the inflation targeting regime. Under the second 
regime, the sample comprises only 17 points for estimation. As we conduct pseudo out of 
sample forecasts under the second regime we need a wide and representative horizon to 
demonstrate forecasting performance. We also need a sufficient number of observation to 
estimate the parameters of the second regime. To achieve this goals we estimate long run 
elasticities in both models under the first regime sample (1999Q1-2014Q3) and use these 
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estimates as restrictions for long run elasticities when estimate the ARX and ECM model in 
the full sample. 
 Long-run parameters in the ECM model are derived from the cointegration 
relationship, while long-run elasticities in the ARX model are a function of all the lag 
polynomial parameters. Therefore, long-run multipliers may be highly underestimated if there 
is a small number of lags in the ARX model. For example, when estimating a VAR on 
monthly data, Bernanke et al.(1997) selected 7 lags, corresponding to a lag length of 
approximately half a year, according to the AIC information criterion. Hamilton and Herrera 
(2004) believe that Bernanke et al. (1997) obtained highly underestimated values of the 
impact of oil price shocks on the U.S. output because of the small number of lags in the 
econometric model compared with the standard specification (with a lag length of one year) in 
the literature and that the model poorly approximates the data generation process. In this 
paper, to ensure a better estimation of long-run multipliers, the number of lags is set to four 
with respect to GDP under the first regime, whilst the other lags are chosen according to the 
Akaike information criterion. Setting a fixed lag length is quite a standard procedure in the 
literature (Stock and Watson 1998; Stock and Watson 2002). The results of choosing models 
according to the Akaike information criterion are presented in Table 1. 
[Table 1 near here] 
After choosing the number of lags, we implemented the residual bootstrap to obtain 
confidence intervals of estimates of model parameters. Table 2 presents the estimates of long-
run parameters, namely, the estimates of output elasticity with respect to oil prices and the 
estimates of long-term growth rates of the structural component of output in both models. 
Table 2 shows that the obtained growth rates of the structural component of real GDP are very 
close to each other. The structural component of long-term growth before and after 𝑇1 is 
estimated at 5.3-5.5% and 1.2-1.5% per year, respectively. The point estimates of the models’ 
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parameters show that, if oil prices rise by 10%, then Russia’s GDP would increase in the long 
term by 0.95% in the ARX model and by 1.06% in the ECM model.  
[Table 2 near here] 
In this paper, we do not show the coefficients corresponding to short-run dynamics in 
autoregressive models because they are difficult to interpret, but, for ease of visualization, we 
build impulse response functions of Russia’s real GDP adjustment to oil shock according to a 
particular regime. Figures 2 and 3 present the point estimates of impulse responses of real 
GDP to a 10% permanent real oil price shock in the ARX and ECM models, along with 16% 
and 84% quantiles. 
[Figure 2 near here] 
[Figure 3 near here] 
Both models identify different short-run dynamics of GDP adjustment to the long-run 
equilibrium, as shown in the diagrams. GDP exhibits a hump-shaped response under the 
managed exchange rate regime. Against the backdrop of a permanent increase in global oil 
prices, the real GDP exhibits accelerated growth rates for 3–4 quarters, after which the oil 
shock effect on GDP begins to wear off gradually. In response to a 10% increase in oil prices, 
GDP at its highest turns out to be 0.06% higher than its long-run level in ARX and ECM 
models. Thus, the econometric estimation reveals that the permanent rise of global oil prices 
positively contributes to output growth rates over 3–4 quarters, after which the contribution of 
growth rates turns negative in the medium term and zero in the long term. The obtained 
estimates show, however, that the inflation targeting regime is best for stabilizing the business 
cycle, and, if there is a change in terms of trade, GDP adjusts gradually to its new long-run 
equilibrium under this regime. 
The obtained results can be interpreted as follows. Under the first MP regime, the 
Central Bank of Russia dampened appreciation of the real exchange rate by keeping a lid on 
the nominal exchange rate against the backdrop of rising global oil prices. And, the increase 
  
12 
 
in aggregate demand on the back of improved terms of trade translated into expanded demand 
for both imported and domestic goods. However, as the real exchange rate firmed up on the 
back of inflation, the domestic production lost its competitive position, and aggregate demand 
moved towards consumption of imported goods. Under the inflation targeting regime, 
however, under a positive terms-of-trade shock, the Russian ruble rapidly appreciated in 
response to a strengthening nominal exchange rate, and higher aggregate demand instantly 
moved toward imported goods. Russian GDP gradually rose on account of gradual expansion 
of production possibilities and capital formation. 
 
Forecasting 
We now turn to real GDP forecasting. We test the forecasting performance of the ARX 
and the ECM models in two pseudo out of sample experiments on the last two years of 
available sample. To predict GDP we also need oil price forecasts. Log oil prices are assumed 
follow a random walk, and we take 0 as the forecast for growth in the log of oil prices. This 
assumption about the expected oil price in the ARX and the ECM models allows us to 
construct us 4-step ahead forecasts for GDP growth rate in the first experiment. In the second 
experiment, we follow Porshakov et al. (2016), who show the applicability of main export 
prices (include oil prices) to nowcasting and forecasting in the context of the dynamic factor 
model for the Russian GDP. We follow their outcomes in experiment 2 to test nowcasting 
performance of the models. Thus in the first forecast period of the second experiment we use 
actual oil prices, and zero oil prices growth for remaining thee period of the forecast. We 
follow the standard practice in the literature of using a classical ARIMA model as the 
benchmark for comparing forecasts (Stock and Watson, 1998; Angelini et al., 2011). We 
apply the Akaike information criterion to select the optimal order of the ARIMA model; 
ARIMA(1,0,1) for the first differences of log of GDP is selected. 
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Figures 4-6 present a comparison between the forecasts and the actual dynamics of the 
time series obtained by the ARX, ECM, and ARIMA models in first experiment, respectively.  
 [Figure 4 near here] 
[Figure 5 near here] 
[Figure 6 near here] 
In Tables 3 and 4 we present the results of first and second experiments, respectively. 
Table 5 presents systematization of the two experiments and estimates the relative RMSE of 
the forecasts by the ECM model to the forecasts by the ARX and ARIMA models. 
[Table 3 near here] 
[Table 4 near here] 
[Table 5 near here] 
It follows from the Tables that the ARX and ECM models greatly outperform the 
ARIMA model in terms of forecasting performance. However, the ARIMA shows the best 
forecasting performance in forecasting for the fourth period and worst on the rest. 
 In the first experiment the ECM model outperforms the ARX model by 6% and 13% 
respectively, and outperforms the ARIMA model by 9% and 16% respectively in terms of 
forecasting for the whole period on average. According to Tables 3 and 4, the usage of 
realized oil prices in the ARX and the ECM model is not helpful in nowcasting, but really 
helpful in improving forecasting accuracy on average for the whole forecast period. For 
instance, the ECM model first step forecast in the first experiment (RMSE=0.0078) is more 
accurate than first step forecast in the second experiment (RMSE=0.0076). However, this 
outcome is only characteristic of the first step of forecast. If we concern average RMSE 
values during the whole forecast period, they decrease from 0.0088 to 0.0085. This situation 
is similar to ARX model. 
Next, we present scenario-based forecasts for the (quarter on previous year's quarter and 
year-on-year) output growth rate in 2019 in Table 6 based on the best model - ECM. Three 
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alternative nominal oil price scenarios for 2019 are considered: basic scenario of the Ministry 
of the Economic Development of the Russian Federation - $63.4/bbl (Ministry of Economic 
Development of the Russian Federation. October, 2018), Wolrd Bank scenario -$68.6/bbl 
(International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook. October, 2018), and International 
Monetary Fund scenario -$69.4/bbl (International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook. 
October, 2018). Real oil prices are calculated on the assumption that dollar inflation changes 
by 0.5% per quarter. Table 6 presents our forecasts. 
[Table 6 near here] 
We believe that the ЕСМ-based forecasts are the most relevant because in all the 
experiments the ЕСМ shows a higher out of sample forecasting performance. Note that all of 
our 2019 YoY forecasts are slightly lower than World Bank, which is 1.5%, International 
Monetary Fund forecast, which is 1.6% and the Ministry of Economic Development of the 
Russian Federation – 1.3%.  
There are two reasons why the forecasts obtained in Table 6 are lower than the forecasts 
of the IMF, WB and MED. The first reason for such low forecasts is that in 2018 the Russian 
economy experienced an increase of 2.3% year-on-year, which was much higher than 
mentioned institutions forecasts. Because of this, both models give a forecast for the 2019 
year in relation to the larger growth in 2018, due to which the forecast for 2019 is low. The 
second reason is that in 2018 average oil prices amounted to $71 per barrel. Thus, in all the 
scenarios, oil prices in 2019 are expected to fall, which also reduces the forecast for the 2019 
year. 
We also admit that IMF world GDP growth forecast for 2018 is equal to 3.3%. This fact 
means that even our most optimistic forecast for growth of the Russian economy much lower 
than the forecasted global growth rate by IMF. Thus, in the coming years, the Russian 
government will have to solve a rather difficult task, given the slowdown in the long-term 
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growth demonstrated in this paper, in that, to keep up with the rest of the world, Russia — a 
developing country — needs to grow at least twice as fast as it is doing.  
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Conclusion 
This paper provides empirical evidence — based on the bivariate ARX and ECM 
econometric models — of the hump-shaped response of the Russian real GDP to the 
permanent oil price shock under the managed float exchange rate regime. That is, the 
managed float exchange rate regime induced more volatile fluctuations in the Russian 
economy’s output in response to oil shocks. The inflation targeting regime was conducive to 
smooth adjustment of output to a new long-run equilibrium. The proposed ARX and 
ECM models attempt to factor in the structural changes in both the monetary policy and long-
run economic growth rates. The out of sample forecasting experiments have shown a major 
improvement in the quality of forecasting by the ARX and ECM models over the baseline 
ARIMA model. The proposed modeling approach may be of practical value in describing 
economies that are highly dependent on terms of trade and countries in which monetary 
policy regime changes have occurred. 
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Tables 
Model 
Lags in ln 
real GDP 
differences 
under the 
first regime 𝑝1 
Lags in ln 
real GDP 
differences 
under the 
first regime 𝑞1 
Lags in real 
GDP ln 
differences 
under the 
second 
regime 𝑝2 
Lags in ln 
real GDP 
differences 
under the 
second 
regime 𝑞2 
Real GDP 
long-run 
elasticity 
value with 
respect to 
real oil price 
ARX 4 1 2 1 0.0951 
ECM 1 1 1 1 0.1059 
Table 1. Results of choosing lags according to the AIC criterion in ARX and ECM models 
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Parameter 
interpretation 
ARX model ECM model 
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
Long-term 
growth rates of 
output under the 
regime before 
2007q3 
𝜇0 0.0138 [0.0089;0.0152] 𝜇0 0.0132 [0.0112;0.0219] 
Long-term 
growth rates of 
output under the 
regime after 
2007q3  
𝜇1 0.0030 [0.0001;0.0065] 𝜇1 0.0037 [0.0015;0.0055] 
Long-run 
elasticity value 
with respect to 
oil prices 
∑ 𝑏𝑗1𝑞1𝑗=01 − ∑ 𝛼𝑖1𝑝1𝑖=1 = ∑ 𝑏𝑗2𝑞2𝑗=01 − ∑ 𝛼𝑖2𝑝2𝑖=1  0.0951 [0.0585;0.138] 𝛽 0.1059 [0.0515;0.1538] 
Note: 95% bootstrap confidence intervals in brackets 
Table 2. Resulting estimates of long-run parameters in ARX and ECM models 
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 ARX  ECM  ARIMA 
RMSE 
one step ahead forecast 0.0093 0.0076 0.0105 
RMSE 
two steps ahead 
forecast 
0.0099 0.0086 0.0114 
RMSE 
three steps ahead 
forecast 
0.0098 0.0096 0.0109 
RMSE 
four steps ahead 
forecast 
0.0081 0.0092 0.0075 
Average RSME for 1-4 
periods 0.0093 0.0088 0.0101 
Note: the best model at each forecasting step is shown in bold 
Table 3. Each step’s out of sample RMSE values for the models, first experiment 
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Step ARX ECM ARIMA 
RMSE  
one step ahead 
forecast (nowcasting) 
0.0095 0.0078 0.0105 
RMSE 
one step ahead 
forecast 
0.0092 0.0074 0.0114 
RMSE 
two steps ahead 
forecast 
0.0094 0.0094 0.0109 
RMSE 
three steps ahead 
forecast 
0.0086 0.0094 0.0075 
Average RSME for 1-
4 periods 0.0092 0.0085 0.0101 
Note: the best model at each forecasting step is shown in bold 
Table 4. Each step’s out of sample RMSE values for the models, second experiment 
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ECM to ARX 
Experiment 1 
ECM to ARIMA 
Experiment 1 
ECM to ARX 
Experiment 2 
ECM to ARIMA 
Experiment 2 
RMSE 
one step ahead 
forecast 
0.82 0.72 0.81 0.74 
RMSE 
two steps 
ahead forecast 
0.86 0.75 0.79 0.65 
RMSE 
three steps 
ahead forecast 
0.97 0.88 0.99 0.86 
RMSE 
four steps 
ahead forecast 
1.11 1.23 1.06 1.25 
Average 
RSME for 1-4 
periods 
0.94 0.87 0.91 0.84 
Table 5. Relative RMSE ECM to ARX/ARIMA for all experiments 
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ARX 
$63.4/bbl 
ECM 
$63.4/bbl 
ARX 
$68.6/bbl 
ECM 
$68.6/bbl 
ARX 
$69.4/bbl 
ECM 
$69.4/bbl 
2019Q1, 
QoQ 0.56% 0.82% 0.73% 0.95% 0.75% 0.97% 
2019Q2, 
QoQ -0.54% 0.01% -0.06% 0.39% 0.01% 0.45% 
2019Q3, 
QoQ -0.68% 0.11% -0.09% 0.52% -0.01% 0.58% 
2019Q4, 
QoQ -0.37% 0.57% 0.30% 1.01% 0.39% 1.07% 
2019, 
YoY -0.26% 0.38% 0.22% 0.72% 0.29% 0.77% 
Table 6. Models-based forecasts for 2019 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Logarithm of the real GDP and Logarithm of the real Brent crude price 
 
Figure 2. Impulse responses of real GDP to a 10% permanent real oil price shock under 
MP regimes, ARX model 
2,3
2,8
3,3
3,8
4,3
4,8
8,8
8,9
9
9,1
9,2
9,3
9,4
9,5
9,6
9,7
9,8
19
99
Q1
19
99
Q4
20
00
Q3
20
01
Q2
20
02
Q1
20
02
Q4
20
03
Q3
20
04
Q2
20
05
Q1
20
05
Q4
20
06
Q3
20
07
Q2
20
08
Q1
20
08
Q4
20
09
Q3
20
10
Q2
20
11
Q1
20
11
Q4
20
12
Q3
20
13
Q2
20
14
Q1
20
14
Q4
20
15
Q3
20
16
Q2
20
17
Q1
20
17
Q4
20
18
Q3 Lo
ga
rit
hm
 
o
f t
he
 
re
al
 
Br
en
t c
ru
de
 
pr
ic
e
Lo
ga
rit
hm
 
o
f t
he
 
re
al
 
G
D
P
Logarithm of the real GDP, seasonally adjusted Logarithm of the real Brent crude price
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1,4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
ch
an
ge
 
in
 
re
al
 
G
D
P
Impulse response under the first MP regime
Impulse response under the second MP regime
68% confidence interval of response under the first regime
68% confidence interval of response under the second regime
  
29 
 
 
Figure 3. Impulse responses of real GDP to a 10% permanent real oil price shock under 
MP regimes, ECM model 
Note: blue line — real GDP growth rate, red lines—4-step ahead forecasts 
Figure 4. Out-of-sample 4-step ARX-based forecasts, first experiment. 
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Note: blue line — real GDP growth rate, red lines — 4-step ahead forecasts 
Figure 5. Out-of-sample 4-step ECM-based forecasts, first experiment. 
 
Note: blue line — real GDP growth rate, red lines — 4-step ahead forecasts 
Figure 6. Out-of-sample 4-step ARIMA-based forecasts, first experiment. 
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